CHAPTER 25
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN PLANNING FOR DROUGHT:
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? by Wilhite, Donald A.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Drought Mitigation Center Faculty Publications Drought -- National Drought Mitigation Center
1987
CHAPTER 25 THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN PLANNING FOR
DROUGHT: WHERE DO WE GO FROM
HERE?
Donald A. Wilhite
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, dwilhite2@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/droughtfacpub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Drought -- National Drought Mitigation Center at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Drought Mitigation Center Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Wilhite, Donald A., "CHAPTER 25 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN PLANNING FOR DROUGHT: WHERE DO WE GO
FROM HERE?" (1987). Drought Mitigation Center Faculty Publications. 87.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/droughtfacpub/87
CHAPTER 25 
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN PLANNING FOR DROUGHT: 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Donald A. Wilhite 
INTRODUCTION 
During the twentieth century, governments have typically responded to drought 
by providing emergency, short-term, and long-term assistance to distressed areas. Emer-
gency and short-term assistance programs are often reactive, a kind of "band-aid" ap-
proach to more serious land and water management problems (Rosenberg, 1980; Hamer, 
1985; Wilhite, et al., 1986). Actions of this type have long been criticized as inefficient 
and ineffective by the scientific community and government officials, as well as by 
recipients of relief. Long-term assistance programs are far fewer in number, but they are 
proactive. They attempt to lessen a region's vulnerability to drought through improved 
management and planning. 
The vulnerability of developed and developing societies to drought has been 
reemphasized as a result of recent drought occurrences in Africa, Australia, Brazil, 
China, and the United States. These droughts have demonstrated the need for additional 
planning to help mitigate the possible worst effects of future droughts. The need for na-
tional drought planning exists in all drought-prone regions, as noted in the recent 
memorandum from the World Meteorological Organization (1986). Case studies of 
recent drought episodes, impacts, and governmental response in Botswana, northeast 
Brazil, and India are included in this section of the proceedings. 
The purpose of this paper is to briefly review and evaluate the policies adopted 
by governments in response to recent episodes of severe drought. The mid-1970s 
droughts in the United States and Canada and the more recent droughts of the early 
1980s in Australia and South Africa will be used as examples of prior drought mitigation 
efforts. Furthermore, recommendations will be made on how governments can improve 
drought mitigation efforts. The concept of drought policy and planning will be dis-
cussed in this context. 
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO DROUGHT: U.S. AND CANADA 
Drou2hts of the Mjd-1970s 
United States. Several episodes of widespread, severe drought have occurred in 
the United States during the past decade. The droughts of the mid-1970s, 1980, 1983, 
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1985, and 1986 are most noteworthy. Each of these recent droughts produced significant 
impacts and major economic losses. However, the mid-1970s droughts were the last 
episodes to result in massive response efforts by the federal government This response 
effort culminated in ~I977after tWo or more consecutive years of drought in large sec-
tions of the Far West, northern Great Plains, and upper Midwest states. 
The years 1974, 1976, and 1977 stand out as those in which the greatest 
economic losses occurred. Impacts were most critical in the agriCUltural sector, but the 
municipal, industrial, and recreational sectors were also affected. In 1974, the timing of 
the precipitation deficiency and heat wave resulted in reduced yields of com and other 
grains, particularly in the central and southern plains states. 
Weather conditions improved considerably during 1975, but drought returned in 
1976 to many western states (Wagner, 1976). By May, the drought-affected area in-
cluded all of California. By July, two pockets of extreme drought had developed. The 
first was in California and adjacent states. The second drought area extended from north 
central Nebraska through eastern South Dakota, southeastern North Dakota, and 
southern Minnesota to Wisconsin. 
It became apparent by January 1977 that, because of below-normal snowpack 
in the Far West, irrigation water would be short the following summer. For example, 
precipitation deficits for the period October-February ranged from 125 mm to 510 mm 
in the Pacific Northwest (Dickson, 1977a). By April, moisture conditions improved in 
parts of South Dakota and the central plains while the drought intensified in Wisconsin 
and Minnesota (USDA, 1977). Drought conditions in the upper Midwest and West 
deteriorated further during April and May, and the total area affected expanded sig-
nificantly. By the end of May, moderate to extreme drought affected the northern half of 
the eastern United States and most of the West as well. 
Moisture shortages and high temperature conditions were moderating by 
August, but the spatial extent of drought had changed only slightly (Fig. 1). The situa-
tion had improved slowly by September, frrst in the Far West, central plains, and central 
Midwest, then in the northern plains. From December 1977 through March 1978, 
weather conditions improved considerably in the far western states. Precipitation was 
normal or above normal during the entire period, which considerably improved the water 
supply outlook for irrigation during the summer of 1978. 
Cana!1a. The drought that affected the Canadian prairie provinces of Alberta, 
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan during the 1976-77 period was largely an extension of a 
widespread drought that was occurring simultaneously in the United States. The drought 
began during the winter months of 1976-77. Precipitation during the period of Septem-
ber 1976 to April 1977 was 50% of normal in the southern portion of Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba and a small portion of Alberta. By April the region's moisture conditions 
were characterized by below-normal snowpack, low soil moisture reserves, and reduced 
streamflow and ground-water reserves. By the end of May, heavy precipitation 
throughout the region had alleviated the impending threat of widespread drought. 
Drou!:bt PoUcy and Assistance Measures Durin!: the Mid-I97Qs 
United States. Although many programs are now available to alleviate 
economic and pbysical hardship caused by natural disasters, only a few of these 
above+4 EXTREME 
+3 to+4 SEVERE 
+2 to +3 MODERATE 
-2 to +2 NEAR NORMAL 
-2 to -3 MODERATE DROUGHT 
-3 to -4 SEVERE DROUGHT 
Values indicate departures from normal climate 
below -4 EXTREME DROUGHT 
Fig. 1 Palmer Drought Severity Index values for the United States, 
August 20, 1977. 
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programs are designed specifically to cope with drought. The total funds allocated 
during 1974-77 to lessen the effects of the drought through various loan and grant 
programs, plus the costs of administering the programs, have been estimated at more 
than $8 billion (Wilhite, et al., 1986). 
Seven programs accounted for the vast majority of funds disbursed during the 
mid-1970s drought. The most important of these was the Farmers Home Administra-
tion's (FmHA) Emergency Loan Program. This program provides credit assistance to es-
tablished farmers, ranchers, and agricultural operators when a natural disaster causes 
physical damage to property or has resulted in severe crop production losses. Emergen-
cy loans are made in counties designated by the president as major or emergency disaster 
areas. Designations can also be made by the secretary of agriculture or the FmHA state 
director. After April 25, 1977, the Interagency Drought Coordinating Committee 
(IDCC) also triggered designations. During 1976-77 apd the fIrSt eight months of 
FY1978, FmHA made more than 92,000 loans totaling $3.23billion (GAO, 1979). 
A second major program of the mid-1970s was the Small Business Administra-
tion's (SBA) Disaster Loan Program. SBA was authorized to make loans as determined 
necessary and appropriate because of floods, riots or civil disorders, and other 
catastrophes. Crop production losses due to drought or other events were fIrSt included 
in SBA's program in June 1977, and loans were made available to farmers beginning in 
July 1977. Two types of loans were available through SBA: physical disaster loans and 
economic injury loans. Congress appropriated $1.4 billion for SBA to meet the demands 
offarmers (GAO, 1979). 
The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), a subagency 
of the United States Department of Agriculture, administered the Disaster Payments 
Program. Under this program, a farmer whose production was reduced by natural dis-
aster to less than two-thirds of his historical average production became eligible for pay-
ment of one-third of the target price level (ASCS, 1976). The total amount disbursed na-
tionally through this program between 1974 and 1977 was more than $1.8 billion 
(ASCS, 1974-77). 
Other programs of significance during the mid-1970s drought were the-Emer-
gency Fund and Emergency Drought Programs of the Department of Interior, $130 mil-
lion; the Community Emergency Drought Relief Program of the Department of Com-
merce, $175 million; and FmHA's Community Program Loans and Grants, $225 million 
(GAO, 1979). 
States in the United States do not have fiscal or administrative responsibility for 
relief measures under conditions of drought or other natural disasters. Since the 1930s, 
this responsibility has been centralized with the federal government (Wilhite, 1983). At-
tempts have been made to initiate cost-sharing measures, such as during the 1950s 
drought, but these have been viewed with disfavor by state government (Wilhite, et al., 
1984). State opposition to cost-sharing on drought assistance measures has been based 
on arguments of limited resources and/or the interstate inequity of available resources. 
The mid-1970s federal and state response effort in the United States has been 
documented and evaluated elsewhere (GAO, 1979; Wilhite, et al., 1984). The latter 
study demonstrated that governments in the United States often respond to drought 
through crisis management rather than by risk management. This was true not only in 
the mid-1970s but also in previous episodes of widespread and severe drought. In crisis 
management the time to act is perceived by decision makers to be short. Reaction to 
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crisis often results in the implementation of hastily prepared assessment and response 
procedures that may lead to ineffective, poorly coordinated, and untimely response. The 
studies cited above suggest that if planning were initiated between periods of drought, 
the opportunity would exist to develop an organized response that might more effective-
ly address issues and impacts specific to drought. Also, the limited resources available 
to government to mitigate the effects of drought might be allocated in a more beneficial 
manner. 
Both of the studies cited above recommend the formulation of a national plan as 
a means of improving federal drought assessment and response activities. The com-
ponents of a drought plan will be discussed later in this paper. Wilhite, et al. (1984), 
also recommend greater involvement by state government in drought planning to comple-
ment and facilitate the federal effort. To date, no formal action on these recommenda-
tions has taken place at the federal level. State planning efforts, largely in response to 
the mid-1970s and subsequent droughts, have been completed in Colorado, South 
Dakota, New York (Wilhite and Wood, 1985), and (most recently) Nebraska and South 
Carolina. 
Canada. In response to the threat of significant impacts in the prairie provinces 
from the short-term drought of 1976-77, both the provincial and federal governments 
responded with emergency fmancial and technical aid programs. Assistance was made 
available for drilling farm and municipal wells, transporting livestock and feed, and con-
structing stock ponds. 
Liverman (1980) evaluated governmental response to this short-term drought 
She concluded that the organizational structure set up to deal with emergencies such as 
drought was ignored during the 1976-77 period. Instead, a hierarchy of new committees 
was established within the government Another coordination problem occurred because 
the jurisdictional units administered by various governmental agencies had different 
boundaries. This resulted in poor coordination between agencies at various levels of 
government 
There was also considerable disagreement between key decision makers over 
what constitutes a drought. This led to disagreement and indecision over the need for ac-
tion. Also, reliance on precipitation statistics to determine the severity of impacts 
resulted in poor assessments of probable impact. The lack of good information and the 
overpublicizing of the event by the media led to overreaction by government. In the 
final analysis the drought was of moderate severity and produced few negative impacts. 
Liverman (1980) concluded that in most cases drought assistance was not justified. 
DroU2hts of the Early 1980s 
AustraHa The 1982-83 drought was confmed primarily to eastern Australia 
(Fig. 2), but portions of this area had been experiencing less severe droughts for a num-
ber of years. South Australia and New South Wales, for example, had experienced 
drought in each year since 1976 and 1979, respectively (Reynolds, et al., 1983). Clearly, 
the droughts preceding 1982-83 increased the vulnerability of agricultural producers to 
added effects of severe drought. 
The "official" drought in New South Wales began in May 1979, when eight of 




Fig. 2 Major drought-affected areas in Australia, 1983. The spatial 
extent of the drought was basically the same during 1982. 
the rainfall situation had deteriorated still further and twenty-three districts were 
declared. Drought persisted but was of variable spatial extent and severity until August 
1982, when a further rapid deterioration occurred. Between September 1982 and April 
1983, more than fifty districts were drought declared. As a consequence of the drought, 
sheep numbers declined from a peak of about 73 million in the 19705 to about 43 million 
in 1983. Cattle numbers declined from a peak of 9 million in 1976 to about 4 million in 
1983. The 1982-83 wheat crop was reduced from the normal 7 million to 1.5 million 
metric tons, for a loss of approximately A$82S million (New South Wales Department 
of Agriculture, 1983). The magnitude of the agricultural impacts in the other eastern 
states was similar to that in New South Wales. Over the entire country, farm debt in-
creased by about 7%; in Victoria, the debt increased by almost 15%. 
South Africa. Droughts are a normal feature of the climate of South Africa. In 
1980 and the early months of 1981 the South African drought was mostly confmed to the 
extreme southwest and northern parts of the country. During 1981 the drought area 
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spread eastward and southward. By early 1982 Palmer Drought Severity Index (pDSI) 
values were in the -2.0 (moderate drought) to -3.0 (severe drought) range for the central 
regions and -4.0 or less (extreme drought) in the extreme west and north. By mid-1983 
the area of extreme drought had expanded significantly in spatial coverage; all but a 
small portion of the Transvaal was affected by at least moderate drought (Department of 
Agricultural Technical Services, 1980-83). 
The drought resulted in severe hardships for farmers and also had a catastrophic 
impact on the nation's economy. South Africa, normally a major exporter of grains and 
other agricultural products. suddenly became an importer. Usually the world's third lead-
ing exporter of corn, South African imports in 1983 were expected to be about 2 million 
tons. Also, exports to neighboring states and to those in East and West Africa were sig-
nificantly reduced as a direct result of the drought. This drought has not been confmed 
to South Africa, but rather has affected a large portion of southern Africa. The impacts 
of and associated governmental responses to this drought in Botswana are the focus of a 
paper in these proceedings by T. C. Moremi. 
Droueht Policy and Assistance Measures of the Early 1980s 
Australia. The Australian constitution does not delegate specific powers cover-
ing natural disaster relief to the federal government. These powers belong primarily to 
the states, which, as a result, have taken a more active role in drought response than state 
governments in the United States and elsewhere. 
Before 1971, natural disaster relief and restoration was provided at a state's re-
quest by joint federaVstate fmancing on a 1:1 cost-sharing basis. No limit was set on the 
level of funding that could be provided by the federal government. In 1971 the Natural 
Disaster Relief Arrangements (NDRA) were established, whereby states were expected 
to meet a certain base level or threshold of expenditures for disaster relief from their 
own resources (Department of Primary Industry, 1984). Disasters provided for in this ar-
rangement are droughts, cyclones, storms, floods, and bushfJCes. These expenditure 
thresholds were set according to 1969-70 state budget receipts and, therefore, varied be-
tween states. The base levels were raised in 1978 and 1984 (National Drought Consulta-
tive Committee, 1984; Keating, 1984). Under the NDRA arrangements, the federal 
government agreed to provide full reimbursement of eligible expenditures after the 
thresholds for state expenditures on natural disasters were reached. The NDRA formal-
ized, for the fust time, joint federal-state natural disaster relief arrangements. 
At the time of the establishment of NDRA, a special set of core measures (i.e., 
federal government-approved drought assistance measures) had evolved in each state on 
the basis of thirty years of government involvement in disaster relief. These measures 
were particularly relevant to the needs of each state because they had been designed by 
state government in response to its own disaster-related experiences. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide data on state and federal expenditures for drought aid 
from 1970-71 to 1983-84 under the NDRA. The magnitude of state expenditures is sig-
nificant, especially when compared to the limited fmancial responsibility of states in the 
United States. The total for all states was just over A$570 million. Of this total, ap-
proximately A$180 million was expended during 1982-83 and A$120 million was spent 
during 1983-84. Federal expenditures to the states for drought aid under the NDRA ar-
Table 1 
Expenditures in Australian States Under Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements, By Type of Disaster, 
1970-71 to 1983-84 (AS Thousands) (National Drought Consultative Committee, 1984) 
DROUGHT 
New 
South Queens- South Western Northern 
Wales Victoria land Australia Australia Tasmania Territory TOTAL 
1970-71 3,239 --- 15,623 --- --- 596 --- 19,458 
1971-72 458 --- 3,143 --- --- --- --- 3,601 
1972-73 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1973-74 987 --- --- --- --- --- --- 987 
1974-75 160 --- --- --- --- --- --- 160 
1975-76 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1976-77 1,120 1,626 --- --- 3,023 --- --- 5,769 
1977-78 2,620 1,228 2,785 13,580 17,999 --- --- 38,212 
1978-79 3,013 1,422 5,165 9,257 8,070 --- --- 26,927 
1979-80 --- --- 2,208 2,225 12,560 --- --- 16,993 
1980-81 66,810 
---
22,768 --- 20,142 --- --- 109,720 
1981-82 31,018 --- 9,608 --- 5,081 295 --- 46,002 
1982-83 53,645 34,796 51,982 27,380 12,653 1,282 --- 181,738 
1983-84 21,500 8,100 63,300 4,600 22,100 1,900 --- 121,500 
(estimate) 
Total 184,570 47,172 176,582 57,042 101,628 4,073 --- 571,067 
Table 2 
Commonwealth of Australia Payments Under Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements, Estimated by Type 
of Disaster, 1970·71 To 1983·84 (AS Thousands) (National Drought Consultative Committee, 1984) 
DROUGHT 
New 
South Queens- South Western Northern 
Wales Victoria land Australia Australia Tasmania Territory TOTAL 
1970-71 450 --- 13,632 --- --- 16 --- 14,098 
1971-72 --- --- 1,502 --- --- --- --- 1,502 
1972-73 
--- --- 46 --- --- --- --- 46 
1973-74 38 --- --- --- --- --- --- 38 
1974-75 114 --- --- --- --- --- --- 114 
1975-76 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1976-77 779 716 --- --- 2,134 --- --- 3,629 
1977-78 1,458 399 3,091 12,350 15,269 --- --- 32,567 
1978-79 743 173 2,942 5,430 6,036 
--- ---
15,324 
1979-80 --- -229 1,224 -270 6,922 --- --- 7,647 
1980-81 42,447 --- 14,780 -737 13,523 --- --- 70,013 
1981-82 14,554 --- 5,162 --- 2,239 267 --- 22,222 
1982-83 32,557 22,695 37,297 18,368 7,731 --- --- 118,648 
1983-84 11,800 4,600 45,300 4,300 15,300 600 --- 81,900 
(estimate) 
Total 104,940 28,354 124,976 39,441 69,154 883 --- 367,748 
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rangements (Table 2) were just under A$370 million, or about A$200 million less than 
the total state expenditures. The largest share of the assistance was provided to 
Queensland and New South Wales. 
In addition to the cost-sharing measures described above, two federal drought 
assistance schemes were available during the 1982-83 drought. These were the Drought 
Relief Fodder Subsidy Scheme and the Drought Relief Interest Subsidy Scheme (Nation-
al Drought Consultative Committee, 1984). The Fodder Subsidy Scheme provided a pay-
ment to drought-declared primary producers to help defray the cost of fodder for sheep 
and cattle. The administrative costs of this program were covered by the states. The 
amount of the subsidy was based on 50% of the price of feed wheat and the nutritive 
value of the fodder relative to wheat; Commonwealth expenditures under this program 
were about A$I04 million during 1982-83 and A$18 million through February 1984. 
The Drought Relief Interest Subsidy Scheme provided payments to eligible 
primary producers to cover all interest payments exceeding 12% per year. To be 
eligible, producers had to have been drought declared and could not have available fman-
cial assets in excess of 12% of the total farm debt. Expenditures for the program, not in-
cluding administrative costs, were about A$3 million in 1982-83 and A$23 million 
through February 1984. 
The Livestock and Grain Producers Association (LGP A) of New South Wales 
has strongly commended the state and federal governments of Australia for their drought 
assistance measures. LGPA based its conclusions on the achievement of what it con-
siders to be the fllSt priority of drought aid in Australia-the preservation of the national 
sheep and cattle herd. Through the preservation of these resources, farm and nonfarm in-
come was able to recover more quickly than after previous episodes of severe drought. 
LGPA estimated that, had government not intervened in 1982-83, some 15 to 20 million 
sheep would have been slaughtered. As a result, post-drought recovery would have been 
delayed, at a cost to the national economy of A$500 million over a five-year period 
(Anonymous, 1983). However, the Working Group for the Standing Committee of the 
Australian Agricultural Council (1983) concluded, "With the exception of concessional 
finance and information, existing policy measures, including those introduced during the 
current (1982-83) drought, do not perform well in achieving the objectives of drought 
policy which it considered important. In summary, the nearly $300 million of expendi-
tures was not cost effective." 
These contrasting views of the cost effectiveness of recent drought measures in 
Australia reflect the recent controversy over state and federal involvement in drought 
aid. Several other studies have been completed (National Farm Federation, 1983; South 
Australian Department of Agriculture, 1983; Stott, 1983), each providing recommenda-
tions for future drought policy. The three Australian Academies of Science (1984) are 
also woPking together to try to resolve this issue. At stake is the role that government 
will play in attempting to alleviate or mitigate the hardship caused by drought and, pos-
sibly, other natural disasters as well . 
. The National Drought Consultative Committee (NDCC) was appointed by the 
Minister for Primary Industry in 1984 to review Australian drought policy. In a recent 
report (Ministry for Primary Industry, 1985) NDCC recommends two objectives for a na-
tional drought policy: (1) to encourage the efficient allocation of national and regional 
farm resources; and (2) to minimize the economic hardship caused by drought. In addi-
tion, the report identifies several specific national objectives and recommends drought 
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policy measures it considers to be the most effective. The committee also addressed is-
sues concerning the administration, eligibility, and purpose of drought programs, as well 
as drought declaration and revocation procedures. 
South Africa. Until recently, actions taken by the South African government in 
response to droughts typically have been poorly coordinated and assistance programs 
have been largely ineffective (personal communication from C. R. Baard. 1985). Ac-
cording to C. R. Baard. chief director of Regulatory Services of the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Marketing in Pretoria, South Africa, the government has 
had difficulty assessing drought impact and making subsequent declarations, as have 
governments of most of the world's drought-prone regions. And. no routine comprehen-
sive evaluation of government drought policy and response efforts has been completed. 
For many decades, drought assistance programs in South Africa have con-
centrated largely on providing relief to the livestock industry, with little attention to crop" 
farming, either dryland or irrigated. A similar situation has existed in Australia. The ra-
tionale behind this emphasis on the livestock industry in South Africa has been that 85% 
of all agricultural land in the country remains under native pastures, most of which lie in 
the dry zones of the western and northwestern part of the country. The incidence of 
drought (i.e., less than 70% of normal precipitation) in these drier zones is about one 
year in three. Only 15% of South Africa receives precipitation in excess of 500 mm per 
year. 
The drought that began in 1978 has affected. to varying degrees, 75% of the 
country. Farmers in the crop regions of the Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Natal 
were hardest hit, as crops were destroyed in four consecutive years. Farmers in these 
states were unable to obtain credit from local cooperatives or commercial banks. There-
fore, the government introduced new drought relief measures, such as debt consolidation 
loans through the Land Bank and Agricultural Credit Board. During the 1984-85 fiscal 
year the government spent approximately R447 million in support of these various 
drought relief programs (personal communication from C. R. Baard, 1985). 
As a result of the extended drought period and the ineffectiveness of govern-
ment drought programs, the South African government recently undertook a substantial 
reevaluation of their drought policy. The Phase Drought Relief Scheme, in effect since 
1946, is now being gradually eliminated. This review of drought policy and programs 
has resulted in a clearer concept of what the objectives of drought relief policy should 
be. Assistance programs, the instruments of that policy, are being revised accordingly. 
The primary objective of the new drought relief strategy for the livestock regions of 
South Africa is to introduce measures that will ensure optimum utilization of the agricul-
tural resources while avoiding detrimental effects on pasture lands. 
DROUGHT POLICY COMPARISONS 
A comparative analysis of drought policy in the United States and Australia 
during recent severe drought episodes has been completed and appears elsewhere (Wil-
hite, 1986). The results of this study will be presented here as examples of two ap-
proaches followed by governments to assess and respond to drought. 
For purposes of comparison, the principal features of drought policy are 
grouped into three categories: organization, response, and evaluation (Table 3). Or-
Table 3 
Comparison of Drought Policy Features: United States and Australia Status as of 1984 
Features 
ORGANIZATION: 
National drought plan 
State drought plans 











In selected states 
Joint USDA/NOAA 
Weather Facility 




Standard for all states, 
varies by program/agency 
Australia 
Study in progress 
Through NDRA agreements 
Bureau of Meteorology 
None available 
State 
Unit varies between states 
Varies between states; 
standard within states 
RESPONSE: 
State fiscal responsibility 
for assistance measures 
State administrative responsi-
bility for assistance measures 
Eligibility requirements and 
provisions of drought assistance 
measures 
National crop insurance program 
EVALUATION: 
Post-drought documentation 
and evaluation of procedures 
and measures 
Negligible, if any 
No responsibility for 
federal measures 
Standard within programs 
for all designated 
counties 
All-risk federal program 
No r01:ltine evaluation by 
government 
Defined by NORA agreements 
up to base amounts, varies 
by state 
Defined by NDRA agreements 
and by federal measures 
Varies by state for NORA core 
measures, standard for federal 
programs 
Rainfall insurance feasibility 
study in progress 
Routine evaluation by federal 
and state governments 
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ganizational features are planning activities that provide timely and reliable assessments, 
such as a drought early warning system; and procedures for a coordinated and efficient 
response, such as drought declaration and revocation. These characteristics would be the 
foundation of a national drought plan. Only a few states in the United States have 
drought plans (Wilhite and Wood, 1985). State drought plans exist only in a loose form 
in Australia under the NDRA agreements. 
Response features refer to assistance measures and associated administrative 
procedures that are in place to assist individual citizens or businesses experiencing 
economic and physical hardship because of drought. Numerous assistance measures are 
available in the United States but few are intended specifically for drought Relief 
arrangements in Australia are, for the most part, included under the NDRA agreements. 
An all-risk crop insurance program has been evolving in the United States since 1939 
(Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, 1980). The Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics has studied the feasibility of a rainfall insurance scheme and recommends the 
adoption of such a scheme under new drought policy guidelines. Hail and flood in-
surance is provided by commercial insurance companies in some areas. 
Evaluation of organizational procedures and drought assistance measures in the 
post-drought recovery period is the third category of drought policy features. Govern-
ments in Australia have been more conscientious in their evaluation of recent drought 
response efforts. In the United States, government sJoes not routinely evaluate the perfor-
mance of response-related procedures or drought assistance measures. The General Ac-
counting Office (1979) made an evaluation of the 1976-77 drought response activities at 
the request of the chairman of the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural 
Resources, the late Congressman Leo J. Ryan. Wilhite, et al. (1984), evaluated 
governmental response. to the mid-1970s drought under sponsorship of the National 
Science Foundation. These were the rust systematic evaluations of federal drought 
response efforts in the United States. 
THE OBJECTIVES OF DROUGHT POLlCY 
The underlying question is this: Should government be involved in providing as-
sistance to those economic sectors or persons that experience hardship in times of 
drought? Because of the frequency, severity, and spatial extent of drought, governments 
in the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and elsewhere have elected to 
provide assistance, and through a wide range of measures. These drought assistance 
measures are the instruments of a de facto policy that has evolved over the past fIfty 
years. The decision on whether to provide aid has been based more often on political 
than economic reasoning. Thus, government involvement in drought relief seems to be a 
political reality, and one that should be dealt with in a more effective and efficient man-
nero 
Previous discussion has concentrated on government response to recent 
episodes of widespread, severe drought in the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
South Africa. These drought relief attempts have been shown to be largely ineffective, 
poorly coordinated, and untimely. In these examples, governments have reacted to, 
rather than prepared for, recurrent and inevitable episodes of drought. 
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For purposes of contingency planning, the objectives of any government 
drought policy must be stated explicitly. Without clearly stated drought policy objec-
tives, contingency planning will lack direction and purpose. Also, the effectiveness of 
drought assessment and response actions will be difficult to evaluate. In response to 
recent experiences, Australia and South Africa have begun stating drought policy objec-
tives and formulating institutional plans and programs to carry out these objectives. 
I propose three objectives for a national drought policy. First, assistance 
measures should not discourage agricultural producers, municipalities, and other groups 
from the adoption of appropriate and efficient management practices that help to al-
leviate the effects of drought Second, assistance should be provided in an equitable, 
consistent, and predictable manner to all without regard to economic circumstances, in-
dustry, or geographic region. Third, the importance of protecting the natural and agricul-
tural resource base must be recognized. Although these objectives may not be achiev-
able in all cases, they do represent a model against which recent drought policies and 
measures, the instruments of that policy, can be evaluated. Drought policy objectives 
are also the foundation of any planning effort by federal and state governments. 
DROUGHT PLANNING: WHAT IS IT? 
Drought planning can be defined as actions taken by government, industry, in-
dividual citizens, and others in advance of drought for the purpose of mitigating some of 
the impacts associated with its occurrence. For purposes of this paper, drought planning 
should include, but is not limited to, the following activities: 
1. A monitoring/early warning system to provide decision makers at all levels 
with information about the onset, continuation, and termination of drought 
conditions and their severity. 
2. Operational assessment programs to determine, reliably, the likely impact 
of the drought event 
3. An institutional structure for coordinating governmental actions, including 
information flow within and between levels of government, and drought 
declaration and revocation criteria and procedures. 
4. Appropriate drought assistance programs with predetermined eligibility 
and implementation criteria. 
5. Financial resources to maintain operational programs and to initiate re-
search required to support drought assessment and response activities. 
6. Educational programs designed to promote the adoption of appropriate 
drought mitigation strategies among the various economic sectors most af-
fected by drought 
DROUGHT POLICY/PLANNING RECOMMENDATIONS 
For government in the United States to significantly improve its drought assess-
ment and response capability, progress must be made in four key areas. The experiences 
of Australia, South Africa, and Canada have been similar to those of the United States, 
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suggesting that the following recommendations will be applicable in these countries as 
well. 
1. Reliable and timely informational products. Reliable and timely informa-
tional products (advisories, reports, management recommendations) and in-
formation dissemination plans must be developed. For example, few can 
question the significance of more reliable and timely information about ap-
propriate drought management strategies. Campbell (1973) has argued that 
Australian farmers have not exploited the available management strategies 
to their fullest. It would appear that this conclusion applies equally well to 
most farmers in drought-prone areas. Government or the private sector 
should provide information to producers, not only about the relative costs 
and benefits of alternative management strategies, but also about the prob-
ability of droughts of various duration and intensity. Such information 
could reduce drought impact as well as the need for government assistance. 
Government must also inform potential recipients more effectively about 
the availability and provisions of drought assistance measures. 
2. Improved impact assessment techniques. Impact assessment techniques 
must be improved. In the case of agriculture, usually the first economic 
sector to experience the hardships of drought, new tools must be developed 
to provide decision makers in government and business with the types of in-
formation necessary to identify the onset and termination of drought and to 
better understand the severity of drought and its likely impact These tools 
would be used by government to identify periods of abnormal risk and to 
trigger various assistance measures. 
3. Centralized designation and revocation procedures. Designation proce-
dures in the United States, for example, must be centralized under a single 
agency or committee with complete authority to determine eligibility for all 
assistance programs. Criteria must be determined in advance of drought, 
well publicized when drought occurs, and applied consistently to all af-
fected states, counties, and localities. Revocation procedures must be 
similarly defined. 
Procedures for drought designation and revocation must be specific to each 
country, reflecting differences in the system of government, the relative im-
portance of the various economic sectors, water supply and management 
characteristics, cultural differences, and so forth. In Australia, for ex-
ample, the declaration of drought areas is a state responsibility, and proce-
dures differ considerably between states. It may not be feasible to stand-
ardize procedures between the states because of the large precipitation 
gradients that exist over much of the country. In contrast, drought declara-
tion decisions in the United States are a federal responsibility, considered 
at a state's request. Declaration procedures vary between agencies and, at 
times, between programs and within agencies. Drought policies with 
respect to revocation of declarations must be better defined and take into ac-
count the lingering effects of drought. 
4. Adoption of a proactive approach to drought assistance program develop-
ment. Assistance measures must be developed in advance of drought-that 
is, a proactive approach should be taken to avoid the delays in program for-
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mulation and congressional approval such as occurred in the United States 
during the mid-1970s. Programs should be administered by a single agen-
cy through the mechanism of an interagency committee in which federal 
agencies with responsibility in drought assessment and response are repre-
sented. Representatives of the affected states and/or regions should be in-
cluded in the membership of this committee. Assistance measures must ad-
dress the specific problems associated with drought. 
Another question deserving considerable attention in the discussion of national 
drought policy is the degree of fiscal and administrative responsibility that states should 
have in support of assistance measures. The Australian approach of cost-sharing these 
programs has been quite successful and may be applicable in the United States and else-
where. Such an approach would allow states to have greater fiscal and administrative 
control over assistance measures. These measures could also be tailored to reflect the 
unique water supply problems and specific drought-related impacts of each state. 
More attention should be directed to the development of assistance measures 
that encourage producers to incorporate appropriate levels of risk management in in-
dividual farm plans. Recipients of drought aid would benefit from knowing, in advance, 
what types of assistance will, and will not, be provided. Generally, Australians prefer as-
sistance in the form of loans because recipients retain the flexibility to use the money in 
a way that best suits their farming situation; that is, farm management decisions remain 
with the farmer. Loans also have an important secondary effect: farmers can continue to 
spend at relatively normal levels and the economy of neighboring communities is not dis-
turbed substantially. Equity requires that loans be made available to all. The Australian 
government has concluded that feed reserves and freight subsidies for water and feed 
can discourage the adoption of appropriate risk management techniques. These 
measures promote soil degradation by keeping livestock on the land during periods when 
the vegetation is severely stressed. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate and compare current drought policy and 
government responses to recent droughts and to offer recommendations for policy 
change. The experiences of the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa were 
used as examples. Four critical needs were identified: (1) reliable and timely informa-
tional products and dissemination plans that provide producers with better information 
about drought, alternative management strategies, and assistance measures available; (2) 
improved impact assessment techniques, especially in the agricultural sector, for use by 
government to identify periods of abnormal risk and to trigger assistance measures; (3) 
administratively centralized drought declaration procedures that are well publicized and 
consistently applied; and (4) equitable, consistent, and predictable standby assistance 
measures that encourage producers to develop and maintain appropriate levels of risk 
management. These measures must not discriminate against good farm managers. Most 
of these recommendations will be applicable to drought policy and planning needs in 
developed and developing countries alike. 
Governments in the United States have responded to drought by crisis manage-
ment rather than risk management. This approach has been grossly ineffective. Several 
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recent studies have addressed the issue of drought policy, or lack of it, in the United 
States and have concluded that we should now move toward drought planning with the 
aim of improving its efficiency. The development of a national drought plan is proposed 
as an effective way of implementing these recommendations in the United States. In 
Australia, two national drought committees have considered the benefits of a national 
drought policy that would be the basis for a plan. A national drought policy, although 
only recently formulated, has now been adopted. Similar progress has been made in 
South Mrica. Actions of this type have been called for in all drought-prone nations by 
the World Meteorological Organization (1986). 
In the United States a national drought plan could encourage and perhaps 
provide incentive to states to take a more active role in planning for drought. In fact, 
drought planning should be coordinated between the states and federal government. In 
the past, most states have played a passive role, relying almost exclusively on the federal 
government to come to the assistance of residents of the drought-affected area. Al-
thougl) the federal government has accepted this role, improving government response to 
drought requires a cooperative effort. States must develop their own organizational plan 
for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on drought conditions. Cost-
sharing of drought assistance measures should be pursued as a means of involving state 
government in drought assistance. The level of state involvement in drought planning in 
other countries must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
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